I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court sounded the death knell for anti-miscegenation laws in Loving v. Virginia, 1 a unanimous ruling in which Chief Justice Earl Warren broadly and unambiguously pronounced such laws unconstitutional as a matter of both due process and equal protection law. Of course, the ruling was immediately significant to Mildred and Richard Loving, who could finally return home to Virginia without fear of criminal prosecution and lift the veil of illegitimacy over their three interracial children. It was also immediately signifi- cant to some states, since they were stripped of the power to enforce existing civil or criminal bans on interracial marriage. The day after, news reports agreed that the decision marked the end of miscegenation nationwide, even though the Court directly invalidated Virginia's law. 2 Since no American law prohibiting or burdening interracial marriage has been enforced in the forty years since Loving was decided, 3 the ruling was, in that particular sense, an effective one.
But, at the time Loving was decided, anti-miscegenation laws were already on their way out. Only sixteen states still had such laws on the books, 4 although all but twelve had once banned such marriages.' Indeed, Maryland had voluntarily repealed its anti-miscegenation law just a few months before the ruling in Loving was handed down, just as fourteen other states had done in the fifteen years prior. 6 And, although the Supreme Court had never addressed the constitutionality of interracial marriage bans prior to Loving, two state courts had already struck down such laws on constitutional grounds. 7 So while the Supreme Court's ruling certainly hastened their demise, the criminalization of interracial marriage had already suffered a cultural blow that was more wounding than the constitutional one.
How, then, does one best celebrate the fortieth anniversary of a case that itself signaled the end rather than the beginning of an era? On anniversaries of Roe v. Wade, for example, commentators still have many live questions to consider about the doctrinal coherence of the ruling, the political backlash against it, the re-emergence of antiabortion laws in spite of it, and the likelihood that the right it estab-lished will survive pressures from an increasingly conservative Supreme Court. 8 But similar questions are not raised by Loving, which did not influence any presidential elections, has not been the victim of state legislative subterfuge, and has never been vulnerable to being overturned, even at the hands of the most conservative Supreme Court justices. 9 So what questions should we ask instead when evaluating the legacy of Loving?
Loving is understood by most to be a "landmark" case, 10 a reference to its perceived great import and significance to American law. A full understanding of Loving's legacy-and the reasons for its revered treatment over the years-must consider not only its immediate effect on anti-miscegenation laws, but also its use by litigants and courts in other legal contexts, as well as its impact on the parties, society and culture. It is this legal, personal, and cultural legacy we try to construct here.
In Part II we consider the influence of Loving on the law, with respect to the right to marry, the constitutional limits on state regulation of family law, and the constitutionality of race-based classifications. In Part III we attempt to place Loving in its personal, societal, and cultural context through a canvass of selected newspaper accounts published near the time of the decision. 11 We also examine academic commentary that relates to the issues in Loving and its impact on the practice of interracial marriage.
II. LOVING'S LEGAL LEGACY
The simple fact that decennial anniversaries of Loving are celebrated by law journals reveals something about its importance to the legal canon. 1 2 Scholars are convened to consider the "legacy" of the case-what it has left us so many years after it was decided. This type of legacy is similar to the one we will someday construct for Lawrence v. Texas, a 2003 case in which the Supreme Court held Texas' criminal same-sex sodomy law unconstitutional. 3 As in Loving, the Supreme Court in Lawrence intervened at the tail end of an era, when most states had already eliminated criminal bans on sodomy, if they ever had them. Only thirteen still criminalized sodomy when Lawrence was decided, and only four of those specifically targeted same-sex sodomy. 14 And, also like Loving, Lawrence was instantaneously "effective" in barring states from adopting or enforcing any such law. But putting an end to legal bans on sodomy is hardly what Lawrence will be remembered for. It will, instead, be remembered for what it did or did not do for same-sex marriage, and for what it did or did not do for other laws regulating sexual conduct, such as adultery, 5 fornication, 1 6 polygamy, 1 7 incest, statutory rape, 18 and even the use of sex toys. 19 11. While we realize that a larger project would justify an examination of articles in local publications, particularly in the southern states, for our purposes here we believe that archival material from The New York Times is fairly representative.
12. This symposium celebrates the fortieth anniversary of Loving. A conference celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of Loving, co-sponsored by Howard, Catholic, and Brigham Young Law Schools, produced a number of articles in a symposium entitled Law and the Politics of Marriage. See Destro, supra note 10 (describing the purpose of the conference to "provide historical, legal, and interdisciplinary background to scholars and practitioners who are interested in the ways that courts, advocates, and scholars use the Court's holding in Loving v. Virginia").
13. 539 U.S. 558 (2003 The Legacy of Loving Although Lawrence has already been invoked in a wide range of cases, four years is too few to sit back and conjure up a legacy, or celebrate an anniversary.
It's not too soon for Loving, though. Forty years is plenty to justify this question: What has Loving meant in American law? Loving's legal and doctrinal legacy is three-fold. Loving has been used to define and affirm the fundamental right to marry, to enforce federal constitutional limits on domestic relations, and to invalidate racial classifications and other practices that perpetuate racial subordination.
A. Loving and the Right to Marry
The contemporary battle over same-sex marriage has given Loving a renaissance. The rhetorical parallels are too tempting to ignore, and the few rulings that have supported marriage or marriage-like rights for same-sex couples have made much of the similarities." 0 But let's not put the cart before the horse. How did Loving shape constitutional protection for marriage in the first place?
Marriage in the Pre-Loving Era
Before Loving, the Supreme Court's role with respect to marriage law was limited to refereeing conflicts between the states, who had long differed over the substantive restrictions on marriage, and, even more stridently, about the accessibility of divorce. 2 ' Increasing mobility and the rise of divorce mills made conflicts between states about the proper regulation of marriage and divorce a common occurrence, disputes which reached the Supreme Court's doorstep on occasion. 2 2 Through those decisions the Supreme Court, and to a greater extent lower federal and state courts, developed an approach to inter-(considering the impact of Lawrence on the validity of Texas's criminal ban on the promotion of sex toys).
20. (1948) (ruling that a Nevada divorce court had no authority to terminate a husband's obligation to provide support established under a New York decree of legal separation); see also Grossman, supra note 21, at 89-100 (considering Supreme Court's approach to interstate conflict over divorce and related judgments). Several states competed for divorce business by shortening residency requirements and adopting more expansive grounds for divorce. Nevada ultimately became the premier divorce mill, and thus many of the conflicts between state recognition that drew on notions of comity, pragmatic considerations about the need for portable personal status, and, where applicable, principles of full faith and credit. 23 There was no federal law norm about the right approach to regulating marriage and divorce before Loving, and thus no substantive principles for the Supreme Court to bring to bear on the few family law cases it heard. 4 There was, instead, merely the need for federal courts to establish a coherent approach to interstate conflicts. This limited involvement was thus consistent with the longstanding belief that domestic relations law was reserved to the states. Indeed, prior to Loving, the Supreme Court had invalidated not a single state marriage or divorce law, 26 despite significant variations among state codes, 27 and had often made clear its belief that marriage was a matter for the states to regulate. As Justice Field wrote in Maynard v. Hill, an 1888 case involving the validity of a legislative divorce granted by the Oregon Territory to a Vermont husband:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution. 24. The Court occasionally made pronouncements about the importance of marriage while elaborating on the meaning of a fundamental right for constitutional purposes, but all of these mentions were pure dicta. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (observing that marriage is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"); Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) .
25. See Hasday, supra note 9, at 831 ("The family law canon contends that family law is, and has always been, a matter of exclusively local jurisdiction ....
Yet contesting the family law canon's construction reveals the existence and extent of federal family law.").
26. The California Supreme Court had invalidated the state's anti-miscegenation law on federal equal protection grounds in 1948, but that ruling was not appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) .
27. See Grossman, supra note 23, at 437-43 (describing marriage law variations in the century prior to 1967).
28. 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (refusing to invalidate the legislative divorce) (emphasis added); see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878) (noting that a state has an "absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved").
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Pre-Loving, then, the Supreme Court's deference to state substantive norms regarding marriage was essentially complete. Loving heralded a new era for the Supreme Court, however, in which state marriage and divorce laws conflicted not only with parallel statutes in other states, but also with developing federal constitutional norms of equality and privacy.
Loving: The Ruling
The facts of Loving are familiar, but worth reiterating. Mildred Jeter, a part-African and part-Cherokee woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, crossed the border in 1958 from their home state of Virginia to neighboring Washington, D.C. to marry. 29 They returned to Virginia and set up house, but were indicted for violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages. "Indicted" is perhaps too polite a description of how the Lovings became criminal defendants, however. Early one morning, three law enforcement officers entered their bedroom, shined a flashlight on them, and asked Richard, "What are you doing in bed with this lady?" 3 When he pointed to their District of Columbia marriage certificate hanging on the bedroom wall, Richard was told by Sheriff R. Garnett Brooks, "That's no good here." 3 1 The couple was hauled off to jail for unlawful cohabitation.
The Virginia law under which the Lovings were charged and convicted criminalized not only a marriage between a white person and a "colored person" celebrated in Virginia, but also such a marriage conducted out of state if celebrated by Virginia residents who left in order to evade the state's miscegenation ban. 32 (Non-whites could marry other non-whites under the code.) The trial judge suspended the sentences on the condition that the couple leave the state of Virginia and not return together for twenty-five years. Explaining the sentence, the judge opined:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, Malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such Second, the Court concluded that Virginia's miscegenation ban violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As discussed in greater detail below, it is the state's proffered defense to this particular challenge-and the Supreme Court's repudiation of it-that has proved the most important aspect of Loving's legacy. Virginia argued that "because its miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination on the basis of race." 3 6 And if the classification is not invidious, Virginia contended, the Court should consider only whether there was any "rational basis" for the state to adopt and further a policy of discouraging interracial marriages. 37 The Supreme Court roundly rejected Virginia's approach, however, and put the so-called "equal application" theory to rest. Ap- The Court did, however, revisit the scope of the federal constitutional right to marry in two important cases after Loving. In 1978, the Court in Zablocki v. Redhail, struck down a Wisconsin statute that prohibited noncustodial parents who were behind on support obligations and whose children were on welfare from marrying without prior court approval. 46 The Court began its analysis with Loving-in its words, the "leading decision" on "the right to marry. ' [VOL. 51:15 the plurality in Zablocki characterized marriage as a right "of fundamental importance," the infringement of which warranted heightened scrutiny. Between the time of Loving and Zablocki, the right of privacy had been broadened to include a panoply of rights regarding marriage, family, intimate relationships, and reproduction. 4 9 In Zablocki, the Court found the importance of the right to marry sufficiently fundamental to justify "critical examination" of laws that significantly interfere with it.
50
Zablocki was not, however, a due process case. 51 It was, instead, a case decided under the now moribund fundamental rights branch of the Equal Protection Clause. So Zablocki did not establish absolute protection for the right to marry; rather, it stands for the proposition that classifications that directly and substantially interfere with the fundamental interest in marriage must be subjected to heightened scrutiny. Though Zablocki was an equal protection case, and Loving stopped short of declaring marriage a fundamental right in its due process analysis, the two cases together have been understood to establish that "the right to marry counts as fundamental for constitutional purposes.
52
Zablocki, moreover, made clear that the Court's unwillingness to tolerate certain marriage restrictions was not limited to those drawn on the basis of race. The defendant in Zablocki, after all-a Caucasian, teenage father of an out-of-wedlock child with a new pregnant girlfriend-was part of no "suspect" class. 5 3 Justice Powell argued in his concurrence in Zablocki that the majority was overreading Loving by applying it outside of the race context, though he agreed with the 50. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383. The precise standard adopted in Zablocki authorizes "rigorous scrutiny" for marriage regulations that "interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry." Id. at 386.
51. For a helpful discussion of Zablocki and its relationship to Loving, see Laurence C. Nolan, The Meaning of Loving: Marriage, Due Process, and Equal Protection Same-sex marriage advocates have invoked Loving in both a doctrinal sense and in a broader rhetorical one. Doctrinally, plaintiffs invoke Loving to argue two points: that "state regulation of the right of access to the marital relationship is subject to constitutional limitations or constraints," 6 and that banning same-sex marriage is a form of invidious sex discrimination. The first successful use of the "Loving analogy" in a same-sex marriage case was in Baehr v. Lewin, a 1993 case in which the Hawaii Supreme Court set the stage for the legalization of same-sex marriage in that state. 63 The court in Baehr first drew on Loving to define the fundamental right to marry. In Loving, the Hawaii court reasoned, the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected the idea that a state could restrict a particular marriage or type of marriage because the "Deity had deemed such a union intrinsically unnatural. ' 64 The Virginia trial court's infamous words about "Almighty God['s]" separation of the races, 65 cited above, made clear that its decision to uphold the miscegenation ban turned on some notion of divine law. In the Hawaii court's view, the reversal of the outcome in Loving by the U.S. Supreme Court also signified a repudiation of this reasoning. "[W]e do not believe," the Hawaii Supreme Court wrote, "that trial judges are the ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that customs change with an evolving social order." 6 6 The plaintiffs in Baehr also made the claim that same-sex marriage bans discriminate on the basis of sex in the same way the antimiscegenation laws discriminate on the basis of race, pointing to Loving's rejection of the "equal application" justification for discrimination. 6 7 In Loving, the Supreme Court refused to accept the argument 64. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. 65. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (quoting trial judge). 66. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. 67. In his dissent from Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the Court refused to invalidate Georgia's sodomy law, Justice Blackmun observed that the "parallel between Loving and this case is almost uncanny," although he did not draw the specific analogy that later took hold among same-sex marriage advocates. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 n.5 (1986) (Blackmun, that Virginia's law was valid because it applied equally to whites and blacks-whites could not marry blacks, just as much as blacks could not marry whites. 6 8 Thus, states should not be permitted to ban samesex marriage as a matter of sex discrimination law because it means that men are permitted to marry women, but women are not, and vice versa. This is, the argument goes, plainly discrimination on the basis of sex because the class of potential spouses is determined by the individual's sex.
The Baehr majority refused to accept the argument made by one of the dissenting judges that the ban on same-sex marriage was valid because it "treats everyone alike and applies equally to both sexes...
[because] neither sex is being granted a right or benefit the other does not have, and neither sex is being denied a right or benefit that the other has."" 6 The court concluded, instead, that "[s]ubstitution of 'sex' for 'race' and article I, section 5 [of the Hawaii Constitution] for the fourteenth amendment yields the precise case before us together with the conclusion we have reached." 7 Thus, based on Loving, the Hawaii court concluded that the ban on same-sex marriage constituted a sex-based classification. This doomed it to almost certain invalidation since such classifications are reviewed with strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution. 71 Same-sex marriage never came to pass in Hawaii, however, because while the case was pending on remand the constitution was amended to grant the legislature the power to ban same-sex marriage, which it subsequently exercised. 7 2
Later cases on same-sex marriage wrestled as well with the import of Loving. To be sure, Loving has been routinely invoked by plaintiffs to make the sex discrimination argument, but with mixed J., dissenting). This analogy was urged by Professor Andrew Koppelman in his student note. See Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 147 (1988) (arguing that just as miscegenation laws were designed to maintain white supremacy, "sodomy laws discriminate on the basis of sex -for example, permitting men, but not women, to have sex with women -in order to impose traditional sex roles").
68. [voL. 51:15 results. 73 Loving has also been invoked in the same-sex marriage context on the broader question of the states' right to restrict marriage given due process protections for the fundamental right to marry, but again with mixed results. Many courts have simply held that Loving did not alter the nature of the fundamental right protected by due process principles, nor did it eradicate the right of states to restrict marriage. 7 4 Other courts have distinguished Loving from same-sex marriage primarily because of their view that racial classifications are uniquely invidious and thus intolerable. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Lewis v. Harris, for example, refused to find that the state's ban on same-sex marriage violated the Due Process Clause of the state constitution, even though it ultimately held same-sex couples were entitled to equal benefits of marriage. 75 For due process purposes, the court rejected plaintiffs' reliance on Loving, noting that "the heart of the case was invidious discrimination based on race" and that the "fact-specific background of that case, which dealt with intolerable racial distinctions that patently violated the Fourteenth Amendment," provides no "support for plaintiffs claim that there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage."76 ) ("Despite the rich diversity of this State, the tolerance and goodness of its people, and the many recent advances made by gays and lesbians toward achieving social acceptance and equality under the law, we cannot find that a right to same-sex marriage is so deeply rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the people of this State that it ranks as a fundamental right."). The court in Lewis was interpreting the due process clause of the New Jersey constitution, but that clause has been interpreted coextensively with its federal analog and the court drew heavily on U.S. Supreme Court precedents in analyzing the issue. See id. at 207.
76. Id. at 210. Though it refused to find a due process violation, the court did rule that equal protection principles require that "committed same-sex couples must be afforded on equal terms the same rights and benefits enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples." Id. at 221. It left the decision to the legislature whether to offer same-sex couples the right to marry or some legally equivalent alternative. Id. at 222-23. In the wake of the ruling in Lewis, the New Jersey legislature adopted a civil union law. Likewise, in Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court interpreted the state constitution to require that equal benefits be extended to same-sex couples (codified ultimately in a civil union bill), 77 but rejected the analogy to Loving as "flawed." As the court explained, "[w]e do not confront in this case the evil that was institutionalized racism;" moreover, plaintiffs "have not demonstrated that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of marriage was intended to discriminate against women or lesbians and gay men, as racial segregation was designed to maintain the pernicious doctrine of white supremacy. "78 Thus, even before courts that were ultimately sympathetic to the claim for recognition of same-sex unions, Loving has not proven to be a trump card.
Some courts refused the Loving analogy because of their perceptions about the differing degrees of historical entrenchment for bans on same-sex marriage versus bans on interracial marriage. As an appellate court in California reasoned, "although anti-miscegenation laws had been around for many years when they were declared invalid," there is "no indication that interracial marriages were regarded at the time as so unprecedented that recognizing them would work a fundamental change in the definition of marriage. ' Loving has also played a less doctrinal, but still important, role in some of the same-sex marriage cases. Take, for example, the ruling of the appellate court in Hernandez v. Robles, which invalidated New York's ban on same-sex marriage." Though it was ultimately reversed on appeal, the ruling exemplifies the rhetorical power of Loving. Justice Ling-Cohan began her opinion by describing the plaintiffcouples before the court and noting, among other things, that the parents of one plaintiff had themselves been denied the right to marry in Texas in the early 1960s because they were of different races. 8 6 "Thirty-eight years later," the judge noted in describing the plaintiffs who had filed suit to challenge New York's ban on same-sex marriage, "their son (Curtis Woolbright), his partner, and four other couples, bring suit to secure the fundamental right to choose one's partner in marriage. ) (order on motion to dismiss) ("Loving in no way held that the right to marry means the right to marry whomever one wishes. Its import is far more focused: that whatever else marriage is about, it is not about racial segregation."); In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 708 (the analogy to Loving clearly falters given the Supreme Court's determination that the true purpose of Virginia's law was "to maintain White Supremacy").
b. Loving and Other Challenges to Marriage Law
Outside of the same-sex marriage context, Loving has had little relevance, if any, in challenging state regulation of marriage. Typical state laws (historically and today) restrict marriages on the basis of age, incest, bigamy, and mental capacity. 89 Relatively few constitutional challenges to state restrictions on marriage have been brought, and Loving has played only a marginal role in them. In Moe v. Dinkins, for example, a federal court considered the validity of New York's statute providing that minors below a certain age can only marry with parental consent. 90 In upholding the law, the court cited Loving only for the basic proposition that the right to marry is fundamental, but quickly dismissed its relevance to the narrower question before it since Loving did not arise "in the context of state regulation of marriages of minors." 9 1 And Loving was not cited at all in Potter v. Murray City, a case indirectly upholding Utah's ban on polygamous marriage against constitutional challenge, 92 or Utah v. Holm, a very recent case upholding a man's conviction for bigamy against a constitutional challenge. 93 The Tenth Circuit in Potter rejected a police officer's claim that he could not be fired for being a polygamist under the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution, noting that: "We find no authority for extending the constitutional right of privacy so far that it would protect polygamous marriages." 94 Because of the relative infrequency with which marriage laws are challenged, the scope of the right to marry under Loving has not really been tested outside of the same-sex marriage context. But when it is invoked in such challenges, Loving provides little guidance as to the ways in which the right to marry can be restricted. 9 (1956) . According to Pamela Karlan, the Court "disingenuously" denied jurisdiction in order to avoid jeopardizing the effectiveness of its recent racial equality ruling in Brown v. Board of Education by tackling the "politically incendiary" question of interracial marriage. See Karlan, supra note 43, at 1463 n.65; see also Wadlington, supra note 7, at 1209-10 (1966) (discussing "speculation about the meaning of the final dismissal of Naim by the Supreme Court").
100. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (citations omitted). 101. See also Destro, supra note 10, at 1218 (noting Loving's support for "federal oversight of State power to define, regulate, and order sexual, marital, and family relationships").
102. 666 F.2d 1328, 1332 (10th Cir. 1982) (rejecting section 1983 claim based on police failure to enforce visitation order) (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 1). of substantive due process rights more generally. Prior to Loving, there were only a handful of cases, mostly involving attempted intrusions into parental autonomy, 0 3 in which the Supreme Court considered overriding a state law regarding family status or operation based on constitutional constraints. But the body of constitutional family law grew dramatically beginning in the 1970s, an arc triggered in part by the Supreme Court's repudiation of Virginia's marriage law in Loving. According to Pamela Karlan, "Loving is seen today as a critical point in the revival of substantive due process."'" 4 The number of specific rights protected by that doctrine increased significantly in the two decades after Loving was decided. 10 5 There is now a lengthy patchwork of cases that stand for the principle that individuals have "the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy, ' ' and Loving is virtually always among those cited. Loving thus provides support for the right not to marry as well as the right to marry, and the related rights to make decisions over a "broad range of private choices involving family life and personal autonomy."' 0 1 7 The Supreme Court includes Loving among the litany of cases collectively establishing the contours of the right to privacy: "Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as 'of basic importance in our society, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.' "108 103. See The Legacy of Loving
C. Loving and the Heightened Suspicion of Racial Classifications
As Zablocki made clear, Loving was not just a case about race. But other cases have made clear that Loving was also not just a case about marriage. Loving v. Virginia has come to stand for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment should be used as a sword to stamp out vestiges of slavery. Because of the centrality of race to Loving, the opinion has had a robust life outside of the family law context. Indeed, some have come to understand Loving as first and foremost a "race" case.' 0 9
The Virginia law at issue in Loving was just part of a broader campaign against racial integration. The version of the Virginia law challenged in Loving was adopted as the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, and passed, according to the Supreme Court, "during the period of extreme nativism which followed the end of the First World War."" t 0 It actually tightened an existing restriction on interracial marriage to prohibit whites from marrying a person with any black blood. As the highest court in Virginia had explained in an earlier, unsuccessful challenge to the law, the state's "legitimate" purposes were to "preserve the racial integrity of its citizens," and to prevent "the corruption of blood," "a mongrel breed of citizens," and "the obliteration of racial pride." ' 1 11 On this record, the Supreme Court in Loving had no trouble concluding that the law was expressly "designed to maintain White Supremacy." 112 The Loving majority took a hard line on racial classifications, both rejecting the "equal application" theory the state had urged (that the law was valid because it punished whites and non-whites equally for marrying in violation of the statute) and applying an unrelenting form of scrutiny to the law. 109. See, e.g., Destro, supra note 10, at 1219 ("The first and most obvious way to characterize Loving is as a 'race' case.").
110 Court upheld a law that punished illicit interracial sexual conduct more severely than illicit intraracial sexual conduct." 4 Because punishment was determined by the nature of the offense (intraracial versus interracial conduct) rather than the race of the defendant, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute against an equal protection challenge. Blacks and whites were both punished less severely for engaging in conduct with someone of the same race, and more severely for conduct with someone of a different race.' 1 5 This characterization enabled the Court to overlook the subordinating effect of the law under the guise of formal equality. Pace wreaked much havoc in lower courts, which could cite it to hold back challenges to their own miscegenation laws. The Supreme Court officially repudiated the reasoning in Pace three years before the Lovings' case came before it. In McLaughlin v. Florida, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute imposing a more severe penalty for interracial cohabitation than for intraracial cohabitation." 6 Florida defended its statute with Pace, but the Supreme Court rejected that view as too narrow a view of the Equal Protection Clause, though it expressly drew no conclusion about the validity of bans on interracial marriage." 7 The Court in Loving read McLaughlin to require "consideration of whether the classifications drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination," 1 regardless of whether they appeared to impose equal burdens on members of different races. Loving thus cemented the death of the equal application theory with its observation that "the fact of equal application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race." ' 9 In the context of racial classifications, Loving's rejection of "equal application" discrimination has stood firm. Loving is also cited as precedent for the level of scrutiny to be applied to race-based classifications. Because of the "Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations," the majority in Loving demanded more than the "rational" and "legitimate" explanations the state tried to offer in defense of the statute. 122 Chief Justice Earl Warren demanded that the state satisfy the "very heavy burden of justification" required for race-based classifications in state laws.
1 23 Loving continues to be cited today for the proposition that racial classifications in a variety of contexts, including affirmative action, 2 4 voting rights, 2 5 school financing, 2 6 and even voluntary desegregation, 2 7 warrant the highest form of judicial scrutiny.
Loving also continues to represent the Supreme Court's efforts to put an end to racial subordination. The observation in Loving that the Supreme Court has "consistently repudiated 'distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality"' is often quoted. Doctrinally, Pamela Karlan has argued, "Loving marked the crystallization, a dozen years after Brown, of the antisubordination principle."' 28 In this vein, Loving is cited in cases like Bob Jones University v. United States, a case challenging the tax-exempt status of an all-white educational institution, for the proposition that a policy against racial affiliation and association is a form of race discrimina- Loving was treated by both the concurrence and the dissent as a cornerstone in the Supreme Court's equal protection doctrine. In the concurrence, Loving was credited for first establishing the principle that race-based classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny1 33 and cited in support of the claim that governmental entities are constitutionally obligated to remedy de jure segregation, but not de facto segregation. 3 4 The dissent, arguing that the voluntary desegregation efforts of two school districts should have been upheld, invoked Loving as one of a long line of cases illustrating the importance of context in understanding the potential for subordination and, thus, the appropriate level of scrutiny. 135 These cases, far afield from the core right to marry, establish Loving's importance to constitutional protection against race discrimination.
III. THE PERSONAL AND CULTURAL LEGACIES OF LOVING
As noted in the introduction to this essay, a significant element of a fuller understanding of Loving and what relevance it may retain some four decades after the Court's decision, is an examination of its impact on the litigants themselves, as well as society more broadly.
A. The Personal Aftermath of Loving
For the Lovings, the Supreme Court's ruling paved the way for them to return to their families and friends in their home state of Vir- Mildred shied away from attention and press coverage, insisting, according to Pratt, that she never considered herself a celebrity. 14 6
She shunned efforts to recognize her contribution to the civil rights movement. As Pratt described Mildred, after meeting with her thirty years after the Supreme Court ruled on her case, "she still sees herself as an ordinary black woman who fell in love with an ordinary white man, and had they been allowed to marry without the state's interference, that would have been the end of it."' 1 47 Peggy Loving Fortune, the youngest of the couple's three children, married a man of mixed race. Though her parents never openly took credit for changing the world, Peggy credited them with setting "the world free to be with whomever they want."' 4 8
B. The Cultural Aftermath of Loving
To consider the broader, cultural legacy of Loving, one may usefully ask, having in mind the two quotations with which this essay begins, whether the comments of the notoriously segregationist Governor of the State of Georgia 149 about "mixed marriages" reflected a national consensus before or shortly after the time when the case was decided. Again, while Mildred Loving's reaction to the case is understandable in light of her personal experience of being convicted and sentenced to prison under the Virginia miscegenation law, and of being forced to abandon her home state, one might speculate that feelings may not have been as strong among other participants in interracial unions, or those who observed, or were indirectly affected 145. See id. 146. She did eventually agree to cooperate with an HBO movie made about the case, Mr. and Mrs. Loving, which aired in 1996. See Pratt, supra note 136, at 242. 147. Id. at 244; see Margolick, supra note 30, at B20 ("We have thought about other people, but we are not doing it just because somebody had to do it and we wanted to be the ones. We are doing it for us, because we want to live here.").
148. See Margolick, supra note 30, at B20. 149. Lester Maddox, a restauranteur, was charged with pointing a gun at two black men who tried to eat at his Pickrick chicken restaurant on July 3, 1964, the day after the Civil Rights Act was passed. He made an unsworn statement before the all-white jury that acquitted him, insisting that he had pulled a pistol, but had not pointed it at "a person or an animal. by them around the time of Loving. We begin with an examination of selected contemporary news accounts published during the latter half of the decade before the Loving decision and others published shortly afterward, in an effort to place the case in context by gauging the popular or societal context that existed at the time.
Two articles published in The New York Times, both of which survey popular opinion relating to interracial marriage, are illustrative. The first article, by Anthony Lewis, appeared in 1964, three years prior to the Court's holding that invalidated the Virginia law anti-miscegenation law, 15° and the second, by William Barry Furlong, in 1968, shortly after the Court rendered its decision. 1 5 ' After pointing out that during the preceding decade, "the legal foundations of racial discrimination in this country have been washed away in the Supreme Court," Lewis notes that "[o]nly one area of race relations has escaped this judicial scrutiny, and that is the most sensitive of all-sex."' 52 Lewis made these comments after the Court had heard arguments in McLaughlin v. Florida, 53 a case that successfully challenged a Florida law against interracial cohabitation. After musing about what "leads people to talk about intermarriage when the issue is the killing of civil-rights workers by Mississippi sheriffs," and why "so many southerners introduce sex into any consideration of school desegregation or even of Negro voting rights,"' 5 4 Lewis observes that as a practical matter, little will change after the invalidation of miscegenous cohabitation laws. This, he writes, is because: only social disapproval really inhibits marriage between whites and Negroes now. Any southern couple desiring to marry in the face of a state anti-miscegenation law can go to a state without one. It is the whole social apparatus of caste, and history, that makes intermarriage unlikely. And of course the choice is always up to the individual. The removal of the legal obstacle would not require anyone to marry anyone else.' 55 Lewis assesses the impact on blacks of the invalidation of laws against interracial cohabitation in much the same way, although for different reasons. The demise of the anti-miscegenation laws would not be immediately relevant to many Negroes, either. Studies show that the right to marry whites is at the distant bottom of the list of Negro desires. At the top are access to a decent job and schools, equality of service in places of public accommodation, equal treatment by law enforcement officials and other immediate issues. It is only the unusual, highly sophisticated Negro who even thinks about intermarriage.'
56
Lewis' conclusions appear to be reinforced by the second referenced article, 15 7 which appeared shortly after Loving was decided in 1967. As the author noted at the time, Stanley Kramer's movie "Guess Who's Coming to Dinner" and Gore Vidal's play "Weekend" had recently appeared. The daughter of Secretary of State Dean Rusk had married a Negro, and the daughter of Senator Edward Brooke, himself identified as a Negro married to a white woman, was in turn planning to marry a white man, leading to the observation that "interracial marriage is in a kind of vogue, though it is hardly the racial amalgamation that Arnold Toynbee once saw as [a route] to world peace. "158 In the balance of the article, based on interviews in Chicago, the author describes several black-white interracial marriages in which the respondents describe a variety of problems, both personal and societal, that have resulted from their status as parties to a racially mixed marriage. The author asserts that " [t] here is a singularity to each of those marriages, though some are more singular than others. No one couple reflects all of the woes and tribulations of marriages across racial lines, but there are some representative reactions and problems." In the first account, for example, a "blonde woman related to a halfNegro truck driver," is warned by her mother to stay away on weekends so as not to reveal her marital situation to the mother's visitors. The mixed-race truck driver, for his part, recounts the fact that he resented his father and "treated him like a dog because he was black" and confesses that he is passing as white so that life will be better for him.
159
The next story is that of "[a] Negro postal worker just over 40 and a white woman a few years younger," who "have been married for 20 years-and isolated for about as long," who "might represent the fairly [VOL. 51:15
The Legacy of Loving typical interracial couple.' 160 He is originally from a slum area of the city and she from a middle class neighborhood; at the time of the account they are living in an integrated neighborhood near the University of Chicago. After a discreet and youthful courtship, they were married in a simple City Hall wedding. Afterwards, the author writes, "[hier family-like the average white in such circumstances-didn't acknowledge the marriage. They feel she's living in sin because she didn't get married in church; they also feel that she's living in sin with a nigger. That disgraced the whole family.' 161 Subsequently, the brothers and sisters of the white wife married and moved to newer Chicago neighborhoods or to the suburbs. She has never gone to see her mother, who is living with one of the sisters in the suburbs, and about whom, the author quotes her as stating: "she's not interested; She's got plenty of other grandchildren, none of them niggers." 162 After reading of her father's death in the newspaper, the woman states that she "went to the church and sat in the back. I thought I could get in and out without anybody seeing me. You know, you go a little late, leave a little early. ' 163 Besides family estrangement, the woman also describes in detail other typical travails that accompanied the "twilight world" of interracial marriage. These included the sudden disappearance of all of the couple's relatives and friends; the difficulty of finding new friends, either black or white; the reluctance to face "the humiliation of traveling together, even in the North"; the need to hide from co-workers the fact of their interracial marriage; and even their decision, after enrolling in night classes at a junior college, to pretend in class that they were strangers.
The article points out, however, that "[slome interracial couples insist that they have not experienced the quiet smoldering desperation that has been the lot of the postal worker and his wife.' 1 64 Apparently representative is the Executive Director of the Chicago Urban League, who has served in that position for ten years and has been a party to an interracial marriage for the same length of time, and who asserts that "[r]aces don't get married; only people do," and that he "didn't marry a white woman" but married his wife and all the problems that come with the particular woman whom he married. Yet, despite these assertions, as the article points out, "the Berrys were opposed by in-laws on both sides," and the marriage was not celebrated in Chicago, but in Milwaukee. 166 Further, at the urging of the prospective husband, a Chicago newspaper that had learned of the planned wedding omitted any discussion of the fact that the marriage would be interracial, but made the point more subtly by printing a picture of the wife.
167
The parties to the final marriage discussed in this newspaper article included "the daughter of Earl Dickerson, one of the richest Negroes in America, "168 who met her husband, an Orthodox Jew, while they were both pursuing graduate studies at the University of Chicago. They were raising their son as a Jew, while the child of the wife's first marriage, to a black man, was being raised as a Christian. Problems growing out of this interracial marriage pale in significance when compared with those in the other marriages described. The article notes, for example:
One of their first problems after their marriage five and a half years ago was the attitude of Steve's father who had many stereotypes about Negroes. "He'd ask us to dinner and have watermelon just for me," says Diane with more wonder than rancor. "Or he'd ask-seriously-if I ate anything besides fried chicken." ' 69 The white husband's account also makes no reference to the kinds of traumatic events the other accounts mention. He observes, with reference to his father:
"He liked to believe -as I suppose most fathers would in the same circumstances that, as the white relative in the union, he was bringing a little bit the better to the situation," says Steve. "Then, bit by bit, he discovered that Diane's father has many of the things that most people covet in life-great wealth and high status in the community. Eventually, I noticed that he was bragging just a bit that his son was married to the daughter of Earl Dickerson. [voL. 51:15 the other marriages described above, in which the participants had significantly fewer financial resources. 7 ' Other reports in the popular press less than a decade before the Loving decision support the conclusion that interracial marriage was far from the most pressing or important issue of race relations in America. For example, the Reverend Farley Wheelwright, a prominent minister told the congregation of the Unitarian-Universalist Church of Nassau County, reporting on his three day visit to Albany, Georgia, that acceptance of interracial marriages would become just as acceptable as interfaith marriages once schools, hospitals and restaurants and the like were integrated.' 72 Wheelwright further observed, however, that Albany residents were a long way from having to deal with the issue, and noted that " [t] he Negro in Albany is not concerned with marrying the white," but " [w] hat he wants today is the vote."' 73 Another account, describing the testimony during the false arrest suit of a clergyman who served as a Freedom Rider, reports that the Protestant Episcopal Church supported eight of nine positions of the Communist Party that related to race relations, including abolition of race discrimination in the armed services. 174 The account concludes, however, that "[t]he one on which he said his church had taken no stand recommended the repeal of laws forbidding interracial marriages.'
The positions of other religious groups in support of biracial marriage were reported routinely in the national press without fanfare. In 1963, for example, the press reported briefly and without comment that the advisory board of the Family Life Bureau of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, described as "the spokesman for the 171. The newspaper article just discussed evoked at least one letter to the editor from a woman who described herself as a white Jewish female mother of five children who had been married to a black male for five years, who bemoaned the fact that writers like the author of the article never seemed to interview people like herself, and who claimed that the only rejection she had experienced was from her parents. She states:
My in-laws have accepted me fully: we planned to have children (otherwise why get married?) and we are not concerned whom our children marry so long as they are good and decent. Catholic hierarchy in the United States," had adopted resolutions deploring "the attitudes and cruel behavior of American society which penalizes and ostracizes those persons who exercise their fundamental human right to free choice of a marital partner by entering into interracial marriages.' ' 176 Some two years later, delegates attending the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church, whose 3.3 million members were overwhelmingly white, were presented with an apparently uncontroversial position paper urging the repeal of laws in nineteen states that at the time prohibited interracial marriage.' 7 7 During the decade of the Loving decision, and even before the case began wending its way to the High Court, opposition to interracial cohabitation and marriage had significantly diminished within secular institutions as it had within religious groups and congregations. In 1963, for example, the United States Air Force ended its practice of asking personnel whether they had married a person of another race during their overseas tours.
17 8 The same year, the resolution committee of the Young Democratic Clubs of America presented to its convention delegates a resolution that condemned state laws banning interracial marriage. It would be naive, of course, to think that opponents of interracial marriage were silent during the years leading up to Loving. Some four years before the decision, for example, Arthur Krock, a prominent New York Times writer, expressed his opinion, after the announcement that the first black woman ever admitted to the University of Georgia had married a white fellow-student, 180 [VOL. 51:15
The Legacy of Loving indefinitely the firebrand that a decision on the constitutionality of [miscegenation] laws would be." ' Krock's alarums seem at best to have been overblown and grossly exaggerated. Indeed, two months after the Court handed down its Loving decision, Virginia's first interracial marriage was scarcely noted.) 82 And months later, the first interracial marriage in Tennessee was celebrated on the steps of the Nashville City Hall and Courthouse. 1 83 Alabama was the last of the states, by means of an amendment of the state's constitution, to repeal its prohibition against interracial marriage. 8 One writer observed on the eve of the vote on the constitutional amendment:
[I]n the state nicknamed "The Heart of Dixie," the land of Bill Connor and George Wallace, the movement to relinquish this searing symbol of the past has caused barely a ripple. There are no billboards on the highways, no marches for or against the repeal, no yard signs or bumper sticker. Articles about Amendment 2, as the ballot measure is known, are few and far between in the local press.'
In sum, if newspaper coverage reflects or even bears on popular opinion, during the period shortly prior to and after the Loving decision, concerns about interracial marriage seem not to have been near the forefront of American consciousness. Yet, these articles also suggest that cultural acceptance of interracial marriage was far from complete, even though laws banning the practice were on the wane.
We conclude with a caveat, perhaps an unnecessary one. The comments and observations that we make here relate solely to what we perceive as the societal view of interracial marriage in the Loving era. We do not mean to draw conclusions about the general state of race relations in America at that time or now. Rather, many would agree with a recent observation-occasioned by the firing of controversial radio personality Don Imus for his racially charged description of the women's basketball team from Rutgers University-that "racism remains a central issue in our national life." 
C. Loving in Academic Commentary
It is surprising to find that there is a paucity of commentary in behavioral or social science journals that address societal or popular attitudes about interracial marriage during the decade of Loving. Although a number of studies have addressed the phenomenon, their concern for the most part, is with the incidence of interracial marriage or, more precisely, whether or not marriages between blacks and whites has increased, rather than with its effects, impact, or the level of acceptance.
1 87 One typical study, for example, summarizes "the small amount of research which has been done on international and interracial marriages" in an attempt to determine, among other things, whether the rate of interracial marriage has increased or decreased. 1 8 8 This study, and others conducted during the four years leading up to the Loving decision conclude that there was at the time a rising trend in interracial marriages. At a later point in his book, Professor Kennedy explicitly discusses Loving and its aftermath, 2 0 0 observing at the outset that "[1]ittle suspense attended the announcement of the Court's ruling." 2 0 ' He summarizes the series of cases that led up to the Loving decision, describing in some detail the courtship, marriage, and prosecution of Richard Loving and Mildred Jeter. He analyzes the Court's opinion Pocahontas in 1614 to Loving and its aftermath). Wallenstein usefully discusses the impact of Loving on the law of marriage in several states, and on federal death benefits, inheritance law, custody law, and same-sex marriage. Id. at 231-45. Another academic historian characterizes Loving v. Virginia as "the most important miscegenation case ever heard and the only one now widely remembered," but limits her account to the fact that neither the lawyers in the case nor the Court relied on expert opinion. See Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of "Race" in Twentieth-Century America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 44, 66 (1996). in Loving" 2 and subsequent state cases and legislative enactments,°3 by which "formal anti-miscegenation provisions were finally erased completely from the American legal system. ' 20 4 None of this, unfortunately, enhances appreciation of Loving's impact on society and culture during the decades after the Court's decision.
Professor Rachel F. Moran's Interracial Intimacy, 0 5 published in 2001, makes a noteworthy contribution to an understanding of Loving's impact. After a richly detailed treatment of the state anti-miscegenation laws in effect prior to Loving, the doctrines, policies and theories that underlay those laws, and the myriad judicial decisions that challenged them, 20 6 Professor Moran concludes:
Anti-miscegenation laws played a critical role in defining racial difference, enforcing racial inequality, and establishing the boundaries of proper sexual and marital practices. The Loving decision lifted formal restrictions on intermarriage, but it would be naive to think that the Court could instantly undo the informal assumptions and practices that developed during three centuries of a "separate but equal" principle in sex, marriage, and family. Loving treated race as a biological irrelevancy by discrediting eugenic theories, but the decision did not take a position on the ongoing social and psychological significance of race in choosing a sexual partner, selecting a spouse or raising a family. Instead, the Justices gave ordinary Americans the freedom to rethink the role of race in their intimate relationships.
7
At a later point in the book, Professor Moran turns her attention to events that followed the Loving decision, first noting the ease with which states complied with the decision, exemplified by the marriage of a black man to a white woman two years later. 0 8 Yet, she observes that despite the removal of legal barriers, "interracial marriages, particularly between blacks and whites, remain an anomaly over thirty years after the decision, ' 209 and that "it has never been clear whether Loving succeeded because official behavior changed or whether it failed because marital behavior remains substantially unchanged.
Research about patterns of racial intermarriage and racial preference in the selection of intimate partners confirms Professor Moran's conclusions. One recent study documented significant increases in interracial marriage since the 1970s, but also noted trends that reflect Loving's limits. 211 Interracial marriages account for only six percent of all married couples in the United States, 212 and African-Americans remain the "least likely of all racial/ethnic minorities to marry whites. '213 And although "the pace of marital assimilation among African Americans proceeded more rapidly over the 1990s than it did in earlier decades, the social boundaries between African Americans and whites nevertheless remain highly rigid and resilient to change. Data from 1990 and 2000 reveal that "race/ethnicity and color, especially the divide between African Americans and others, represent a strong and persistent barrier to racial mixing in romance and marriage. ' '2 Research on dating preferences also reveals that a significant proportion of the population prefers to date people of the same race.
6
While Professor Moran offers a number of reasons why samerace marriage continues to persist after Loving, the following is most pertinent for the purposes of this essay:
The most striking feature of the aftermath of Loving v. Virginia is how readily people have accepted segregation in marriage, so long as it is not officially mandated. Despite compelling evidence that race continues to matter in affairs of the heart, Americans embrace a colorblind ideal. Same-race marriages are not considered evidence of racism, nor are they seen as a barrier to racial equality. Americans overwhelmingly believe that so long as people do not despise members of another race, they are free to love members of their own race without legal interference or moral reproach.
27
The cultural legacy of Loving, like the law's power to transform societal norms more generally, is thus limited. 
IV. CONCLUSION
It is hard to question the importance of a case like Loving v. Virginia to the canon of American law. It shaped two substantive constitutional doctrines and recalibrated the balance of federal-state power over domestic relations. Loving's declaration of marriage as a fundamental right not only has played an important role in defining the right to marry, but also is central to the long line of cases in its wake that broadened and strengthened a right to privacy that encompassed decision-making over virtually all aspects of family life without government interference. Likewise, Loving's pronouncements about the Constitution's intolerance for racial classifications and other vestiges of slavery have been invoked in a wide variety of contexts and serve as a potent reminder of the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose. The legal legacy of this case, then, is clear.
Beyond the legal texts, the legacy of Loving is less well-defined. The Lovings themselves benefited greatly from the ruling in their favor, which enabled them to have the only thing they wanted: to live together as a married couple in peace. And for the years before Richard's tragic death, the Supreme Court's ruling indeed granted them that wish. Other couples in the sixteen states that still banned interracial marriage benefited as well from the Court's broad pronouncement that all such laws were immediately unenforceable. Those laws would have disappeared eventually, however, since the winds were already blowing against race-based marriage restrictions in 1967. Even if Loving had never reached the Supreme Court, it is highly unlikely we would still have miscegenation laws in 2007. But Loving did hasten their demise and brought immediate relief to couples, like the Lovings, who might not have lived to see the winds of cultural change complete their work.
Legalizing interracial marriage was an essential step toward racial equality. For the government to deny individuals access to such an important institution of civil society for no reason other than the color of their skin is obviously inconsistent with notions of formal equality. The legacy of Loving, however, seems to stop there. Interracial marriages remain, forty years later, a relatively unusual occurrence, and the black-white cultural and marital divide is still deeply entrenched. That cultural change has lagged behind the legal change is no criticism of the Supreme Court's ruling in Loving, but simply a reflection of the limits of law. Had Loving come out the other way, we would certainly not come together to celebrate its anniversaries.
